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Abstract. The relationship between slack resources and innovation is complex, with the
literature linking slack to both breakthrough innovations and resource misallocation. We
reconcile these conﬂicting views by focusing on a novel mechanism: the role slack time
plays in the endogenous allocation of time and effort to innovative projects. We develop
a theoretical model that distinguishes between periods of high- (work weeks) versus low-
(break weeks) opportunity costs of time. Low-opportunity cost time during break weeks
may induce (1) lower quality ideas to be developed (a selection effect); (2) more effort to be
applied for any given idea quality (an effort effect); and (3) an increase in the use of teams
because scheduling is less constrained (a coordination effect). As a result, the effect of an
increase in slack time on innovative outcomes is ambiguous, because the selection effect
may induce more low-quality ideas, whereas the effort and coordination effect may lead to
more high-quality, complex ideas.We test this framework using data on college breaks and
on 165,410 Kickstarter projects across the United States. Consistent with our predictions,
during university breaks, more projects are posted in the focal regions, and the increase is
largest for projects of either very high or very low quality. Furthermore, projects posted
during breaks are more complex, and involve larger teams with diverse skills. We discuss
the implications for the design of policies on slack time.
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It’s no coincidence that Microsoft and Facebook both got
started in January. At Harvard that is (or was) Reading
Period, when students have no classes to attend because
they’re supposed to be studying for ﬁnals.
—Paul Graham, Y Combinator Founder, quoted in
“How to Get Startup Ideas”
1. Introduction
The relationship between slack resources and innovation
is complex, with the literature linking slack resources to
breakthrough innovations and increased experimenta-
tion (Cyert and March 1963, Thompson 1967, Bourgeois
1981, Levinthal and March 1981), but also to individuals
and teams becoming less selective and disciplined about
the projects they work on (Cyert and March 1963,
Leibenstein 1969, Fama 1980, Staw et al. 1981, Jensen
1986, Jensen et al. 1994). This poses a challenge for
organizations that want to encourage innovation to
increase their productivity and competitiveness and
also worry that introducing slack may negatively
distort the allocation of time and effort across the
organization.
We build on this tension, but identify a novel driver
for the effects observed in the literature by focusing on
how slack time shapes the allocation of resources to
innovative projects. In particular, using a simple eco-
nomic framework, we capture how differences between
periods of high- (workweeks) versus low- (breakweeks)
opportunity costs of time inﬂuence the quantity, quality,
and type of projects innovators work on. In the setup,
low-opportunity cost time during breaks may induce
(1) lower quality ideas to be developed (a selection effect);
(2) more effort to be applied for any given idea quality
(an effort effect); and (3) an increase in the use of teams
because scheduling is less constrained (a coordination
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effect). As a result, the effect of slack time on in-
ventive outcomes is ambiguous because on the one
hand the selection effect may induce lower quality
ideas to be developed, but, on the other hand, the
effort and coordination effects may lead to more
high-quality, complex ideas.
We take the predictions of the framework to data
from Kickstarter, the world’s leading reward-based
crowdfunding website.1 Crowdfunding platforms have
become increasingly important for entrepreneurial en-
deavors in a variety of segments, ranging from the arts to
technology (Agrawal et al. 2013, Belleﬂamme et al. 2014,
Mollick and Nanda 2016).2 Understanding the deter-
minants of the creative supply on these platforms is in
and of itself interesting. Additionally, the results provide
novel insights for the design of “slack time” policies
within organizations.
In the empirics, we leverage variation in the avail-
ability of slack time generated by school breaks across
locations with top U.S. universities. Relative to more
fragmented, constrained time during the semester,
breaks provide students with continuous blocks of time
to work on nonschool related projects. The sample
includes all projects launched on Kickstarter between
April 2009 andApril 2015, and information on the exact
timing of school breaks across regions. The unit of
analysis is the city-week, and we compare the number
and the characteristics of projects launched in a given
city during break weeks versus work weeks. The re-
gressions control for city and week ﬁxed effects to
isolate confounding factors such as general time trends,
seasonality, and different baseline levels of innovative
activity across locations. Even though we do not ob-
serve the exact amount of time creators spend on their
projects, we take advantage of ﬁne-grained data on
project characteristics, market valuation, and proxies
for the amount of effort spent on the fundraising pages
to capture inventive inputs and outputs. The combi-
nation of the large-scale nature of the data, which cover
165,410 projects and 7 years of observations, and a novel
identiﬁcation strategy lets us cleanly estimate the causal
effect of changes in slack time on innovative outcomes.
First, we document the positive impact of slack time
on the quantity of projects launched. The regression
results show that during school breaks the number of
crowdfunding campaigns created increases by up to
45%. We provide a series of results in support of the
causal interpretation that these additional projects are
driven by an increase in the availability of slack time.
Speciﬁcally, we show that when top engineering
schools are on break, we see a positive effect on tech-
nology projects but not on art projects and vice versa
when art and design schools are on break. We then
examine days when universities are closed for snow,
providing an exogenous increase in slack time:
signiﬁcantlymore projects are posted on snow days. As
further robustness, we show that the increase in pro-
jects is unlikely to be driven by increased capital
availability due to students providing more funds to
projects while on break.
Second, relative to work weeks, break weeks are
associated with signiﬁcantly more projects at the
very low end of the value distribution, fewer projects
in the middle, and more projects at the high end of
the distribution. The empirical patterns also support
the predictions about differences in effort and co-
ordination costs. When the opportunity cost of time is
lower, more effort is allocated to ideas, especially
high-value ones. Furthermore, “overlapping” slack is
disproportionately beneﬁcial for the creation of com-
plex projects that may require input and coordina-
tion between team members with different skills and
perspectives.
Third, we exploit a policy change on the platform,
which affects only two of its categories, to investigate if
policies targeted at curtailing low-quality contributions
can mitigate the negative effects of slack on innovation.
Using a difference-in-differences empirical strategy,
we ﬁnd that after the shock the relative shares of top-
value and team projects in the affected categories
increase disproportionately during breaks, suggest-
ing that the new rules were effective in limiting re-
source misallocation.
The paper provides a novel framework—centered on
the opportunity cost of an innovator’s time—for ana-
lyzing the relationship between slack time and innovative
outputs. The results highlight that a sufﬁcient amount of
time (in contiguous blocks, in particular) is critical for
implementing high-potential and complex projects, and
that “overlapping slack” is important when ideas beneﬁt
from teams with diverse skills. This is consistent with
recent shifts from spread-out forms of individual slack
time (e.g., Google’s 20% time) to more structured pro-
grams that provide teams of employees with longer,
continuous blocks of time off from regular commit-
ments (e.g., Google’s “Area 120”). The ﬁndings also
caution that too many marginal, low-potential projects
are generated when slack time is available. Therefore,
complementary policies, such as the stricter screening
mechanism we study with the policy change on the
platform, are likely to be valuable in conjunction
with slack.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the literature on slack and innovation. Section 3 presents
a formal model that derives the differences in the
quantity and type of projects developed during pe-
riods of high- versus low-opportunity cost of time.
Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy.
Section 5 reports the regression results, and Section 6
concludes.
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2. The Literature on Slack and Innovation
Innovation requires organizations and individuals to
allocate time and resources away from short-run ob-
jectives, and to focus attention not only on long-run
goals but also on less explored areas of the search space.
“Slack search” (March 1976, Levinthal andMarch 1981)
fundamentally differs from “problemistic search” (Greve
2003) because of the way it relaxes the constraints that
normally guard the use of key resources within an or-
ganization (Bourgeois 1981). Acting as a catalyst for ex-
ploration, slack allows ﬁrms to experiment with new
ideas, products, strategies and markets that would oth-
erwise be considered too risky to engage in under a tra-
ditional cost-beneﬁt analysis (Thompson 1967, Hambrick
and Snow 1977, Moses 1992). Slack also contributes to the
long-term growth of an organization by buffering it
from changes in the environment (Galbraith 1973,
Meyer 1982) and their repercussions on performance
(Kamin and Ronen 1978); by isolating it from the
internal turbulence generated by the often conﬂicting
incentives of its subunits (Cyert and March 1963,
Pondy 1967); by helping it cope with task uncer-
tainty in decision making and information processing
(Galbraith 1973); and by allowing it to initiate the
changes in strategy and policies (Bourgeois and Singh
1983) needed for adaptation (Kraatz and Zajac 2001).
Furthermore, in the presence of slack, failure of an
innovative project is less likely to lead to a loss in
legitimacy within the market and to consequences for
the managers involved, as downside risk can be
absorbed by the organization without constituting
a threat to its long-run survival (Thompson 1965).
Whenever internal capital market controls on R&D
are less stringent and “patient capital” is available,
individuals can champion high variance projects that
have an extremely high chance of failure, but that can
also deliver—if successful—very high returns (Astley
1978, Mokyr 1990, Garud and Van de Ven 2002).
Whereas empirically this often translates into slack
being associated with superior performance, risk-
taking, and innovation (Singh 1986, Bromiley 1991,
Miller and Leiblein 1996), the relationship has been
shown to both depend on the underlying quality of the
organizations involved (Greenley and Oktemgil 1998)
and on the overall level of slack available (Nohria and
Gulati 1996).
In their seminal piece, Cyert and March (1963)
highlight how, in the presence of slack, negotia-
tions and innovation can also be less effective, as re-
source abundance leads individuals to be less selective
and apply less effort. Similarly, agency theory identiﬁes
slack as a source of conﬂict between the objectives of
the principal and the actions of the agent, and con-
cludes that the buffer that slack provides dimin-
ishes risk-taking behavior, is a source of inefﬁciency,
and leads to inferior performance (Leibenstein 1969,
Fama 1980, Jensen 1986, Jensen et al. 1994). Under this
view, slack encourages rent-seeking, decreases explo-
ration (Tan and Peng 2003, Mishina et al. 2004), makes
it easier for individuals to ﬁnd support for their pet
projects, andmore difﬁcult for organizations to abandon
bad projects (Staw et al. 1981). As a result, organizations
that are resource constrained can outperform those
with slack because of the more disciplined nature of
their decisions (Starr andMacMillan 1990,Mosakowski
2002, Baker and Nelson 2005).
A ﬁrst set of attempts at reconciling these opposing
views on slack (Singh 1986, Sharfman et al. 1988, Tan
and Peng 2003) builds on Bourgeois’ (1981) insight that
not all forms of slack resources are the same, and vary in
their degree of liquidity, that is, in how difﬁcult it is to
repurpose them towardnewuses.While “unabsorbed,”
uncommitted slack is mostly beneﬁcial, absorbed slack
can be harmful to an organization and lead to inertia.
Nohria and Gulati (1996) extend this view by hypothe-
sizing and testing for an inverse U-shaped relationship
between slack and innovation: In the absence of slack,
experimentation cannot be sustained because of the high
variance associated with its outcomes; in the presence of
too much slack instead, organizations lose any form of
discipline inselectingwhichprojects tosupportandmake
wasteful investments.
Whereas we incorporate this tension between the
positive and negative effects of slack from the literature,
we focus on a new, understudied mechanism through
which an increase in slack time can shape the allocation
of time and effort to innovative projects: the opportu-
nity cost of time. Our economic perspective, grounded in
a simple theoretical framework, allows us to derive new
predictions about the effect of slack on the rate, quality
and type of innovation. Moreover, by endogenously
changing the types of ideas being pursued and the
amount of effort dedicated to them, our framework
based on the opportunity cost of time is able to
incorporate some of the familiar predictions from
the literature without resorting to additional, strong
assumptions.
We also contribute to the literature by focusing on
a less studied form of slack, time, and by measuring its
causal effect on innovation.Most past work has focused
on slack ﬁnancial resources, and has rarely taken ad-
vantage of exogenous variation in slack. A key ex-
ception is Natividad (2013), who relies on unexpectedly
successful projects to estimate the causal effect of an
increase in ﬁnancial resources on ﬁrm performance,
and ﬁnds that slack drives ﬁrms to add more projects
and imitate—unsuccessfully—what led to the un-
anticipated positive outcomes in the ﬁrst place.
Like ﬁnancial slack, slack time is a resource that affects
all types of organizations, teams, and individuals. Al-
though organizations can use ﬁnancial slack to hire more
workers and free up time, time-related slack creates a
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distinct set of opportunities from ﬁnancial slack alone.
The opportunity cost of time, in particular, has been
shown to dramatically inﬂuence the types of research
collaborations individuals engage in and breakthrough
innovations (Catalini 2017).
Perlow (1999) documents that fragmented time
(as opposed to the continuous spells we focus on with
college breaks) can have a negative effect on pro-
ductivity because of the way it disrupts concentration.
Time, moreover, is a “network good” (Young and Lim
2014), because its value increases with the ability to
coordinate its use with others (Zerubavel 1985), and
scheduling conﬂicts can become a barrier to social
relations (Winship 2009). We incorporate these ideas in
the analysis of how slack time inﬂuences projects that
are more likely to beneﬁt from team coordination and
diverse skills, generating an additional set of pre-
viously untested predictions.
Taken together, the results have novel implications
for how organizations design their policies around
slack, and surface the need for both stricter screening
mechanisms to avoid low-quality contributions, and
for overlapping slack between team members to en-
courage experimentation with complex, high-quality
ideas that require coordination between individuals
from different functional areas within an organization.
3. Theoretical Framework
This section develops a simple model to explore the
impact of slack time on innovation. It captures a key
difference between work and break periods: the op-
portunity cost of time is lower during breaks. In this
setting, break weeks should be broadly interpreted
as uninterrupted periods of time during which in-
dividuals do not need to attend to their regular tasks,
but are allowed to experiment with new projects more
freely.
We later extend the framework to incorporate a
second, important qualitative difference in the nature
of time between these two periods: time is less frag-
mented and coordination among collaborators is easier
during breaks (i.e., the “network good” properties of time
are more salient during breaks). This gives individuals
more ﬂexibility in coordinating schedules and the
ability to iterate faster on the development of their
projects.3
3.1. Basic Setup
One idea arrives in each period.4 The realized value of
a project v depends on two factors: the idea’s intrinsic
quality q (i.e., its latent potential), and the amount of
effort (or, equivalently, time in this context) devoted
to developing the project, e. We assume that v  q · e.
Thus, the realized value of a project increases with both
the idea’s intrinsic quality and the amount of effort
dedicated to it. The innovator’s payoff from developing
an idea at a certain effort level is assumed to be
πw  qe − c(e;w), (1)
where c(e;w) is the cost of effort, with w ∈ {0  break;
1  work} indicating the time period. Because the op-
portunity cost of time is higher during work
weeks, c′(e; 0)< c′(e; 1).
It is important to note that we set up the model
within the crowdfunding context to better integrate
theory and empirics. The basic premises and pre-
dictions of the model are, however, more general. To
reiterate, the two key assumptions—(1) the opportu-
nity cost of time of working on a new project is lower
when an innovator’s routine tasks are less demanding;
and (2) given a project’s intrinsic quality, when more
time and effort is devoted to its advancement, the value
of the project increases—are, by no means, speciﬁc to
the crowdfunding setting. These assumptions apply
to a range of settings, including employees allocat-
ing time between routine and nonroutine projects
within a ﬁrm.
To obtain analytical results, we assume that the idea
quality q follows an exponential distribution and that
the cost function is convex in effort: c(e;w)  cwe22 , with
c0 < c1.5 The payoff in Equation (1) can be rewritten as
πw  qe − cwe
2
2
. (2)
The ﬁrst-order condition yields the optimal effort level
as e∗w  q/cw. Thus, given any quality level, less effort is
spent when time is more precious (i.e., when there is
less slack time); when given the same opportunity cost
of time, more effort is spent when the idea is better (i.e.,
individuals endogenously allocate effort based on the
latent potential of an idea). Inserting e∗w back into
Equation (2), we obtain the innovator’s payoff at the op-
timal level as π∗w(q) 
q2
2cw
.
A campaign page on a crowdfunding platform typi-
cally includes a description of the project, the amount
requested, information on deliverables and implementa-
tion plan, and background information on the project
creators. Creating such a page requires substantial ef-
fort, which naturally screens out low-quality projects
(for which applying effort to create a page is not worth-
while). We operationlize this in the model by introduc-
ing e¯, which is theminimumamount of effort required to
have a project accepted by the platform. As mentioned
before, a key side effect of slack is its negative effect on the
qualityofprojectsbeingpursued.Organizations thatwant
to provide slack to encourage experimentation, but that
alsowanttoprevent thecreationof toomany, low-quality
projects, can combine it with a selection mechanism
targeted at curtailing such projects. In the model, this
Agrawal et al.: Slack Time and Innovation
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would be represented by an increase in e¯. In Section 5.4,
we explore what happens to the types of projects posted
when—because of a sudden policy change on Kick-
starter—this threshold is exogenously increased in
two of its categories and innovators face an organi-
zational change targeted at reducing low-quality
contributions.
Denote the innovator’s payoff at the minimum
required effort level as π¯w(q)  qe¯ − cw e¯
2
2 . Taking into
account theminimum effort requirement, the innovator’s
payoff can be written as
π˜w(q) 
l{q≥ cw e¯}
q2
2cw
+ l{q<cw e¯}
(
qe¯ − cwe¯
2
2
)
if the project is developed
0 if the project is dropped,
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(3)
where 1{ · } is an indicator function. An innovator who
develops a project obtains π∗w(q)  q
2
2cw
when the quality
of the idea is sufﬁciently high (when q≥ cwe¯ ). In this
quality range, the optimal amount of effort is above the
minimum requirement. For ideas of relatively low
quality (when q< cwe¯ ), the innovator’s payoff is π¯w(q) 
qe¯ − cw e¯22 , because the optimal effort is below the
required level. In this range, the innovator overdevelops
the project (relative to the desired amount of effort
given the quality of the idea) to meet the minimum
requirement and obtains a payoff that is below the
desired level. Despite this, the innovator still develops
the project if π¯w(q)> 0, which is the normalized outside
option.
Figure 1(a) illustrates the innovator’s payoffs sepa-
rately for break and work periods using a numerical
example. Given any idea quality q, the innovator’s pay-
off for a break is higher than a work period. This is
because the opportunity cost of time is lower during
breaks and, at the same time, the project’s value increases
as more time is spent on it. It is straightforward to show
that the innovator develops an idea only if its quality is
above a certain threshold and that this threshold is less
stringent during breaks.6 Thus, we have Prediction 1
(see Online Appendix A1 for the proof and other
results):
Prediction 1 (Differences in Quantity). More ideas are
developed during break periods than work periods.
The value of a completed project is
v˜w(q)  l{q≥cw e¯}
q2
cw
+ l{cwe¯2 <q<cw e¯}qe¯. (4)
Notice that ideas with quality q< cwe¯
2
are dropped.
Figure 1(b) illustrates the value of developed projects as
a function of idea quality. It highlights two consequences
of a lower opportunity cost of time on the overall value
of posted projects. First, because time is less costly, the
innovator is less selective when screening out ideas.
Thus, the value of some of the projects developed
during breaks is lower than any project developed
during a work period (i.e., a “selection effect”).
Second, also because time is less costly, the innovator
can work more on any given idea and improve it.
This “effort effect” increases a project’s value v,
given the same intrinsic starting quality q.
The comparison of the average value of projects be-
tween work and break periods is ambiguous because
the two effects discussed above push it in opposite di-
rections.We therefore compare the distributions directly.
Figure 1(c) plots the conditional densities of developed
projects by their value v using the same numerical ex-
ample in Figure 1, with q following an exponential
distribution. Compared with work periods, there are
disproportionately more projects at the low end of
the distribution during breaks because the innovator
is less selective about screening out bad projects. At
the same time, there are also more projects at the high
end of the distribution, because the idea quality required
to achieve a certain project value is lower during breaks
as a result of the effort effect.
Prediction 2 (Differences in the Distribution of Project
Value, Conditional on Development). Relative to work
periods, projects developed during breaks are both
more likely to be at the low end (v< c1 e¯
2
2
) and at the high
end of the distribution (v≥ c1e¯2).
The above result hinges on the assumption that more
effort makes projects better. As illustrated in Figure 1(b),
the innovator can achieve the same value vwith a lower-
quality idea during a break because more time can be
devoted to improving a project. Prediction 3 builds on
this observation.
Prediction 3 (Differences in Effort). For projects with the
same value v, the amount of effort spent on projects
developed during breaks is greater than (or equal) to
the amount of effort spent on projects developed
during work periods. Furthermore, the difference in
effort is greater for projects of higher value v.
We now explore the impact of an increase in the
minimum effort requirement e¯. Overall, a more strin-
gent posting requirement should increase the quality
thresholds for both break and work periods and, as
a result, fewer projects should be developed. The rel-
ative size of the reductions, however, is ambiguous.
On the one hand, the increase in the threshold per se
is greater for work periods (i.e., ∂q¯1
∂e¯  c12 > ∂q¯0∂e¯  c02 ), which
is intuitive because increasing the effort requirement
is more taxing when time is more precious. On
the other hand, because the distribution of idea qual-
ity q is likely to be skewed to the left, the number of
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projects dropped may be greater during breaks if these
periods encourage more low-quality projects to begin
with.
Prediction 4 (Effect of Increasing the Minimum Effort Re-
quirement e on Relative Quantities). When the distri-
bution of idea quality q is not too skewed to the left
(when the mean of the exponential distribution is
greater than c1e¯2 ), the reduction in quantity due to an
increase in the minimum effort requirement is smaller
for breaks than work periods.
For both break and work periods, the expected value
of projects developed should be higher after an in-
crease in the posting requirements. The relative size of
the increases is ambiguous, and depends on the pa-
rameter values and the distribution of q. However, be-
cause such a policy shock does not affect projects of high
quality (they are always above the selection threshold),
the share of top-valued projects developed during breaks
(relative to the total number of projects developed
during both periods) should increase. That is:
Prediction 5 (Effect of Increasing the Minimum Effort Re-
quirement e on Relative Project Value). The share of top-
valued projects developed during breaks (relative to
the total number of projects developed during both
periods) increases after an increase in the minimum
effort requirement.
Figure 1. Numerical Illustration of the Model: Innovator’s Payoff, Value of Developed Projects, and Density Distribution of
Project Value, Conditional on Development
Notes. (a) Plot of the innovator’s payoff from developing a project as a function of the idea’s intrinsic quality, q. (b) Plot of the value of developed
projects as a function of the idea’s intrinsic quality, q. (c) Plot of the probability density distributions of v conditional on development. The
parameter values of the numerical example are c0  1; c1  2; and e¯  3. In addition, for panel (c), idea quality q is assumed to follow an
exponential distribution with mean 1.5.
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4. Data and Empirical Strategy
The empirical setting is Kickstarter, the world-leading
reward-based crowdfunding platform. We collect data
for the 165,410 U.S.-based projects that attempted to
raise money on the platform between April 2009 and
April 2015. Project-level information that is publicly
available includes the time each project was posted,
total funds raised, the project description, and the
background of the entrepreneur(s). We do not have
comprehensive data on the timing of individual contri-
butions to a project or the location of the funders.7
The platform attracts innovative projects in the early
phases of their development. Depending on the sector,
entrepreneurs may have working prototypes of their
product or a concrete plan for the ﬁnal deliverable
(e.g., a concert). The crowd is typically asked to fund
the “R&D” needed to implement the plan and turn
such prototypes into an early adopter version that can
be ultimatelymass produced.While the invention phase
may be concluded by the time some of the projects are
posted, inmost cases there is still substantial market and
technical uncertainty that needs to be resolved before
commercialization.
As crowdfunding platforms have expanded, this
market for online capital has become very competitive.
Launching a successful campaign requires substantial
marketing, PR and social media effort targeted at
building a community of early supporters. Moreover,
a campaign page needs to offer high-quality video, text,
and graphics to attract the crowd’s limited attention in
a context where thousands of projects are posted every
day. Campaigns also require constant attention and
care after they are launched, and project creators need
to meaningfully engage with the crowd through Q&A
and updates to maintain fundraising momentum.8
Kickstarter requires projects to state a funding goal
in advance. If a project fails to achieve its funding goal,
then the capital is returned to funders and the entre-
preneur does not receive any money. We label projects
that achieve their funding goal as “successful” and the
ones that do not as “failed.” Projects in the data col-
lectively raised $1.4 billion, including both successful
projects (44% of projects and 89% of raised capital) and
failed projects (56% of projects and 11% of raised
capital, which is eventually returned).
We use funds raised as a proxy for a project’s
commercial potential and revealed market demand.
Similar to ofﬂine capital raised by startup founders,
capital raised on the platform is among the best available,
systematic measures of the commercial potential of an
entrepreneurial project. As previously documented
(Agrawal et al. 2013), the distribution of capital is
highly skewed: the top 1% (10%) of projects accounts
for $590 million ($1 billion), or 42% (76%) of the
capital.
Kickstarter identiﬁes a city for each project based on
the location reported by the entrepreneurs. This pro-
vides a smaller geographic measure than a core-based
statistical area (CBSA) and a larger one than a Census
Place. We use city as the location measure in the
analysis because it does not involve further aggrega-
tion or disaggregation of the core dependent variables.
The sample projects span 10,091 U.S. cities, taken from
Kickstarter’s list on its website.
Kickstarter is widely used in many college towns.
For example, Boulder, Colorado; Provo, Utah; and Ann
Arbor, Michigan, are among the top 10 places for
technology projects per capita. In light of the prominence
of locations with colleges on Kickstarter, the empirical
analysis exploits the week-by-week variation in the ex-
tent of slack time in these places. We manually collect
data on school breaks between 2009 and 2015 for the top
200 U.S. colleges as deﬁned by U.S. News & World
Report.9 This information is publicly available through
posted academic calendars. We consider a location to
have a school break in a given week if there is a top 200
college within 5 miles of the city center and the college
has a break that week. In addition to scheduled breaks,
we also manually collect data on snow days from school
websites, Twitter, and online news reports.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics at the city-week
level for the sample. Approximately 3.3% of the ob-
servations are city-weeks, where at least one of the top
200 colleges is on break, and Table 2 compares key
outcome variables between break weeks and work
weeks, providing model-free evidence for some of the
basic predictions of the model.
During the study period, the average city-week had
0.052 projects launched, with slightly more than half
(0.029) failing to reach their goal and the remainder
(0.023) successfully reaching it. In most city-weeks, no
projects are launched. Relative to work weeks, the
number of projects per week is signiﬁcantly higher for
breaks (0.39 versus 0.04).10
We use three different proxies for effort in the
analysis: the length of the text (in words) used to de-
scribe a project, the number of frequently asked
questions (FAQs) the entrepreneur lists on the page,
and the number of project updates posted. Relative to
work weeks, the descriptive statistics show that pro-
jects posted during breaks have longer descriptions,
more FAQs, and more updates. We also examine the
impact of breaks on team projects and how that varies
with project complexity. We capture team projects by
identifying the number of team members listed on
the projects’ biography pages. Overall, 3% of projects
are posted by teams. Relative to work weeks, a sig-
niﬁcantly greater percentage of projects posted during
breaks use teams (12.8% versus 2.7%). Using the bi-
ographies, we also identify the skills mentioned by cre-
ators in their proﬁles (e.g., programming, photography).
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We use the resultant measures to build two proxies for
project complexity: the number of unique skills listed,
and the number of unique skills divided by the size of the
team (to avoid a mechanical relationship between team
size and the total number of unique skills). Among
projects posted, the mean number of skills is 1.5, and the
mean number of skills per team member is 1.2. These
values are higher for projects posted during breaks.
Overall, the raw data are consistent with the basic
predictions of our framework: break weeks are char-
acterized by signiﬁcantly more projects, and more ef-
fort devoted to the posted projects. Furthermore, we
observe an increase in project complexity and the use
of teams. However, because these differences might
be driven by a number of confounding factors such as
time trends, seasonality, and differences in the baseline
level of crowdfunding activity across cities, we control
for these differences using the empirical strategy de-
scribed below.
4.1. Empirical Strategy
The econometric framework we use is straightforward:
we exploit variation across cities in the timing of breaks
at local colleges and universities to estimate how an
increase in slack time inﬂuences the number and type
of projects posted. The unit of analysis is a city-week.
City ﬁxed effects are included to control for underlying
differences across cities that are constant over time, and
week ﬁxed effects are added to control for changes in
the Kickstarter environment over time. We focus on
a linear model with ﬁxed effects to document the un-
derlying relationships in a direct and easily interpret-
able manner:
Yct  γAllBreaksct + µc + ψt + ct,
where Yct is the outcome variable such as the number
of projects posted on the platform in city c during
week t,11 AllBreakct is a dummy that equals one if there
is a top 200 college in the focal city on break in the
focal week, µc and ψt are city and week ﬁxed effects,
and ct is an idiosyncratic error term. There are few city-
level measures that change at the week level. Un-
surprisingly, given city and week ﬁxed effects, results
do not change when including controls such as weekly
temperature and annual CBSA-level demographics.
Thus, we focus on the more parsimonious speciﬁcation
and do not include additional covariates. Because the
ﬁxed effects completely capture cities in which we
never see any crowdfunding activity, we remove these
cities from the analysis without any empirical conse-
quence. Robust standard errors are clustered at the city
level for all regressions.
5. Results
We ﬁrst present regression results on the quantity of
projects posted. Consistent with the raw data, a sub-
stantially greater number of projects are posted during
break weeks. We follow this main result with evidence
supporting a causal interpretation. Second, we report
results on the impact of breaks on the distribution of
project value. Third, we examine differences in project
complexity and the likelihood of teams during break
weeks versus work weeks. The results are informative
about the role that uninterrupted time plays in reducing
coordination costs. Finally, we exploit a Kickstarter
policy change that increased the posting requirement in
some but not all project categories to test the effect of
a stricter selection threshold on curtailing the negative
effects of slack time on innovation quality.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Projects 3,178,665 0.052 0.761 0 114
Total successful projects 3,178,665 0.023 0.398 0 45
Total failed projects 3,178,665 0.029 0.425 0 79
Funding 3,178,665 444.686 23,633.61 0 21.8M
Total successful funding 3,178,665 393.86 23,149.05 0 21.8M
Total failed funding 3,178,665 50.821 1,784.375 0 623,041
All breaks 3,178,665 0.033 0.178 0 1
Snow closing 3,178,665 0.001 0.034 0 1
Table 2. Comparing Break and Work Periods
Difference Standard error p-value
Break Work
N Mean N Mean
Projects 0.356 0.002 0 104,440 0.396 3,074,225 0.040
Funding 3700.27 74.33 0 104,440 4023.38 3,074,225 323.11
log Funding 0.613 0.004 0 104,440 0.755 3,074,225 0.141
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5.1. Quantity of Ideas Developed (Prediction 1)
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that, controlling for week
and city ﬁxed effects, the number of crowdfunding
campaigns launched increases during school breaks by
0.024 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). The magnitude of the
increase is substantial relative to the average number of
campaigns per city-week of 0.052 (ﬁrst row in Table 3),
implying an increase of 45%.
In terms of the total amount of funds raised, we use
funding (not logged) as the dependent variable in col-
umn 2 of Table 3. The estimated coefﬁcient on school
breaks is also positive but not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. This is likely because the distribution of funding is
highly skewed. Thus, we use log(Funding+1) as the de-
pendent variable in column 3. The result shows a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant correlation between total funding
and college breaks, with an increase of about 1.5%.12 In
Table 4, we divide our sample by locations with an
above versus below themedian share of college students
based on the American Community Survey: consistent
with our interpretation of the main result, the effect of
breaks is entirely driven by locations with a high student
presence (column 2).13
5.1.1. Evidence for a Causal Interpretation. The mech-
anism behind Prediction 1 suggests that the positive
correlation between the quantity of projects and breaks
is causal: breaks enable more projects to be devel-
oped because the opportunity cost of time is lower. By
including city and week ﬁxed effects, the basic empirical
strategy helps isolate a potentially spurious correlation
due to general time trends, seasonality, or time-constant
differences in innovative activity across cities. In the rest
of this subsection, we provide additional evidence in
support of a causal interpretation of this relationship.
First, we exploit variation across types of universities
and Kickstarter categories to examine whether the
spike in activity is consistent with the type of human
capital involved. We do this because, although we
obtain variation in breaks using university-level data,
we measure activity at the city level. Thus, demon-
strating that the city-level effect (e.g., more technical
projects posted on Kickstarter) is consistent with local
university-level human capital (e.g., break week for an
engineering school as opposed to an art school) pro-
vides further evidence that is consistent with our in-
terpretation. In column 1 of Table 5, we use only
projects in art, and in column 2 we focus on projects in
technology.14 Breaks at top art, design, ﬁlm, and theater
schools are positively correlated with art projects but
not technology projects. Conversely, breaks at top
engineering schools are positively correlated with
technology but not art projects, consistent with the
expectation that technical orientation plays a key role
in these types of projects. Relatedly, in column 3
of Table 5, we run the main speciﬁcation only for
projects where we are able to identify the presence of
a student on the team using the biographies posted on
Table 3. Impact of Breaks on the Quantity of Projects
Variables (1) Projects (2) Funding (3) log Funding
All breaks 0.0238*** 20.9730 0.0155***
(0.0083) (259.5038) (0.0039)
Observations 3,178,665 3,178,665 3,178,665
R-squared 0.164 0.003 0.787
Number of cities 10,091 10,091 10,091
Notes. The dependent variables are, respectively, the number of projects in a city-week, the total amount
of funding, and log(Funding +1). City and week ﬁxed effects are included in all regressions. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the city level.
***p< 0.01.
Table 4. Robustness to Sample Deﬁnition by County-Level College Enrollment
Variables (1) Below median college students (2) Above median college students
All breaks −0.0084 0.0257***
(0.0069) (0.0090)
Observations 1,589,175 1,589,490
R-squared 0.621 0.142
Number of cities 5,045 5,046
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of projects. Columns 1 and 2 separate the sample by
whether the associated counties have above or below the median number of college students, according
to the American Community Survey (ACS). City and week ﬁxed effects are included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level.
***p< 0.01.
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Kickstarter. The estimated effect is 0.0034. Relative to
the mean of the dependent variable, 0.0066, the effect
of breaks in this sample is a 51% increase in projects,
which is higher than the 45% increase we observe in
the full sample.
Second, we examine the impact of an unexpected
increase in the amount of slack time using college
closings due to heavy snow. Column 4 of Table 5 shows
that snow breaks are also associated with a signiﬁcant
and positive increase in the quantity of projects. In
addition, column 5 uses the city-year as the unit of
observation and regresses the number of projects on
the total number of snow days in that city-year, con-
trolling for city and year ﬁxed effects. Given that the
number of days that a college cancels classes due to
snow varies exogenously from year to year and city to
city, the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient is consis-
tent with such random increases in slack time having
a positive, causal impact on the number of projects
produced.
Third, if breaks provide college students with more
time to browse Kickstarter and fund projects, then the
resultmay be driven by an increase in the supply of local
capital. To assess this alternative explanation, we ex-
amine the timing of funding associated with projects
posted in the week preceding a break. In particular, we
measure whether funding for those projects increased
during the break. For consistency, we speciﬁcally look at
8–14 days after posting. If the effectwemeasure is due to
increased funding during a break, thenwewould expect
to observe an increase in funding during breakweeks for
projects posted just prior to the break. However, results
reported in columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 indicate that
funding associated with projects started during a work
week does not rise during break weeks even though
fundraising efforts continue during those weeks.
It is important to highlight that the breaks we ex-
plore in the main analysis are scheduled and expected,
and therefore people might shelve ideas andwait until
they have more time to develop them.15 Shelving per
se does not invalidate the causal impact of breaks.
What is important is that the completion of some
critical tasks beneﬁt from the availability of more time.
The slack time provided by the breaks offers un-
interrupted periods where students can focus, push
their projects further and team coordination is easier.
In the absence of slack, these ideas are likely to stay
undeveloped for a longer period of time or not be
developed at all (in the same way employees at a ﬁrm
may have ideas about improving a product or service,
but may not have the time and resources to develop
them until they are offered the opportunity to do so in
a structuredway).16 Although it is empirically difﬁcult
to capture shelving, for a subset of projects, we were
able to collect information on when the creator started
working on the idea (columns 8–10 of Table 5).Ta
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Excluding these projects that have been clearly shelved
(column 10) does not affect our results.
We also do not observe strong evidence of shelving
in the data. Figure 2 plots the regression results that
include dummies for the weeks before and after
a college break period in themain speciﬁcation, and the
baseline is any week more than ﬁve weeks away from
a college break. The ﬁgure shows no decrease in activity
immediately before or after a break. This lack of a
pretrend is inconsistent with individuals shifting the
development of their ideas in anticipation of a break.
5.2. Project Value Distribution and Effort
(Predictions 2 and 3)
In the previous section, we show that when college
students are on break in a city, there are substantially
more projects posted and more funds raised on
Kickstarter. The increase in quantitymay have different
implications depending on the quality of these addi-
tional projects. Prediction 2 suggests that relative to
work weeks, during breaks we should observe dis-
proportionately more projects at both the low end and
the high end of the value distribution. This prediction
arises from the lower opportunity cost of time dur-
ing breaks inducing (1) more marginal projects to be
pursued because time is less precious (a selection effect)
and (2) more effort to be allocated to the development
of an idea, which, in turn, increases project value (an
effort effect).
To examine the impact of breaks on the distribution
of project value, we divide projects into 15 bins based
on the amount of funds raised (the bins are deﬁned
by year to account for the growth of the platform).
Table 6 reports the results from a regression in which
the dependent variable is the number of projects in
a speciﬁc bin, the unit of analysis is a city-week-bin,
and ﬁxed effects for weeks and cities are included as in
the previous tables. The results are consistent with
Prediction 2: relative to work weeks, breaks are char-
acterized by signiﬁcantly more projects of the lowest
value (bin 1), fewer projects in the middle of the dis-
tribution (bins 2–6), and more projects on the right
tail of the distribution (bins 7–15). Furthermore, the
effects become increasingly larger and more signiﬁ-
cant as we move away from the middle of the
distribution.17
Recall that the model assumes that given a project’s
latent quality, more effort makes it better, which
Figure 2. (Color online) Number of Projects per Week Is
Higher During Breaks
Notes. Estimated coefﬁcient for weeks before and after the school
breaks. The dependent variable is the number of projects created in
the focal city-week. Regression includes city and week ﬁxed effects.
Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals based on robust
standard errors clustered at the city level.
Table 6. Impact of Breaks on Project Value Distribution
Variables Projects
All breaks × Bin 1 (lowest value) 0.0091***
(0.0019)
All breaks × Bin 2 −0.0115***
(0.0024)
All breaks × Bin 3 −0.0018
(0.0012)
All breaks × Bin 4 −0.0015
(0.0011)
All breaks × Bin 5 −0.0013
(0.0012)
All breaks × Bin 6 −0.0012
(0.0008)
All breaks × Bin 7 0.0003
(0.0008)
All breaks × Bin 8 0.0007
(0.0005)
All breaks × Bin 9 0.0025***
(0.0008)
All breaks × Bin 10 0.0024**
(0.0010)
All breaks × Bin 11 0.0028**
(0.0014)
All breaks × Bin 12 0.0050**
(0.0020)
All breaks × Bin 13 0.0053**
(0.0024)
All breaks × Bin 14 0.0061**
(0.0029)
All breaks × Bin 15 (highest value) 0.0063*
(0.0034)
Observations 47,679,975
Number of cities 10,091
R-squared 0.031
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of projects in a speciﬁc
bin of project value, and the unit of analysis is a city-week bin. We
divide projects into 15 bins based on the amount of funds they raise,
from the lowest (bin 1) to the highest (bin 15). Bins are deﬁned by year
to account for the growth of the platform. City and week ﬁxed effects
are included the regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the city level.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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explains why we observe a positive effect of breaks
on the right tail of the project value distribution. It is
therefore important to see whether the data are con-
sistent with this mechanism. In particular, Prediction 3
shows that we should observe more effort during
breaks and that the difference in effort should be larger
for projects of higher value. This prediction is con-
ﬁrmed by the results reported in Table 7. First, col-
umns 1–3 show that the average values for the three
different proxies for effort (length of project de-
scription, number of FAQs, and number of updates)
are all signiﬁcantly higher for projects posted during
breaks.18 Second, when we separate projects into
different bins of the value distribution, results show
that for all measures of effort, the difference between
break and work weeks increases as we move from the
lowest bins (columns 4, 7, and 10) to the highest ones
(columns 6, 9, and 12).
In sum, the results of this section are consistent with
the model’s prediction that we should observe dis-
proportionately more projects on both tails of the value
distribution. The right tail is particularly interest-
ing because these projects are more likely to have
a disproportionate impact. The results on effort seem to
corroborate the mechanism we hypothesized for the
creation of these high-impact projects; that is, entre-
preneurs are able to devote more effort to executing on
their ideas when the opportunity cost of time is lower.
It is useful to highlight that our result on the distri-
bution of project value can also be explained by a
change in the risk proﬁle of the projects being pursued.
If the innovator is risk averse and the project value is ex-
ante uncertain, lowering costs in general (and the
opportunity cost of time in particular) may lead to the
development of a greater number of risky projects and,
thus, a greater likelihood of both low-value and high-
value projects.19
This behavior has been observed for scientists
following a reduction in distance-related costs and
opportunity cost of time (Catalini 2017) and for en-
trepreneurs (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2016). Recall
that there is no uncertainty in our model and that the
lower opportunity cost of time increases projects on both
tails of the outcome distribution because of a selection
effect (some low value projects are now worth de-
veloping) and an effort effect (more time and effort can
be dedicated to high value projects). Because it is difﬁcult
to imagine an innovative project without any ex-ante
uncertainty or an innovative project that would not
beneﬁt from effort, both mechanisms (the one proposed
in our model, and the one based on uncertainty and risk-
averse entrepreneurs) are likely to coexist.
The uncertainty mechanism does not explicitly model
effort; hence, it has no predictions about this variable.
Effort, however, is an important building block in our
framework, and Prediction 3 has clear implications for
the impact of breaks on the amount of effort devoted to
a project and how they relate to project value. The results
presented in Table 7 are consistent with this prediction,
providing further support for our theoretical approach.
That said, we want to emphasize that we cannot rule out
the uncertainty mechanism discussed above and that
it may also play a role in driving the distribution of
project value.
5.3. Teams and Project Complexity
Projects may be carried out by teams for at least two
intuitive reasons: (1) with multiple people sharing the
workload, a team can achievemore than a single person,
and (2) complex projects may require people with com-
plementary skills and perspectives. The downside of
a team, however, is that it requires coordination, and
this may become especially daunting as project com-
plexity and the interdependence between its different
components increases. In Online Appendix A2, we ex-
tend the baseline model to examine the use of teams. In
addition to differences in the opportunity cost of time,
the extension captures a second distinction between
break and work periods: teamwork is more effective
during breaks because coordination is easier.20 The
extension yields the following predictions. First, the
comparative advantage of breaks from a teamwork
perspective is most salient for complex projects, and
less relevant for simple projects. We should therefore
observe a greater share of complex projects during
breaks. Second, because forming a team can also help
share the workload, and this may be more valuable
when time is scarce (i.e., during work weeks), the
effect of slack time on the number of team members is
ambiguous. However, if we contrast complex projects
to simple ones, the predictions are clear cut, and we
should see more teams during breaks for complex
projects relative to simple ones.
The empirical results are consistent with these pre-
dictions. As mentioned before, we use two proxies for
project complexity: the number of unique skills on
a project (as captured from the biographies of the
entrepreneurs), and the number of unique skills di-
vided by team size. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show
that for both measures, projects posted during breaks
appear to be signiﬁcantly more complex than projects
posted during work weeks. Consistent with the raw
data, the regression results also show that on average
projects posted during breaks are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be carried out by teams than projects posted
during work weeks (column 3 of Table 8). However,
results are different when we separate the sample into
relatively complex projects versus simpler ones.21 For
relatively complex projects (columns 4 and 6), the like-
lihood of teams is signiﬁcantly higher during breaks. In
contrast, for simpler projects (columns 5 and 7), there is
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no signiﬁcant difference between break and work pe-
riods in the likelihood of using a team.22
5.4. Effect of Increasing the Minimum Effort
Requirement (Predictions 4 and 5)
In May 2012, Kickstarter implemented a policy that
disproportionately increased the requirement for posting
projects in two of its categories. In the context of the
model, the new policy increases the minimum effort
required to develop a project. Whereas it is ambig-
uous whether the relative share of projects posted
during breaks should increase after the policy change
(Prediction 4), the model predicts that we should
observe an increase in the share of top-valued projects
(Prediction 5). In other words, the shock should limit
the negative effect of slack on innovation by reducing
the relative number of low-quality contributions. In
response to a series of high-proﬁle design and technology
projects that raised a signiﬁcant amount of capital and
then failed to deliver the promised products in the
anticipated amount of time (some delivered very late
and others failed to deliver at all), Kickstarter in-
creased the requirements for posting projects in those
two categories. One of the primary criticisms was that
in most of these cases the entrepreneurs raised capital
and promised a product without any experience or
preparation for production or distribution. Therefore,
in May 2012 Kickstarter revised its rules to address
accountability concerns, explaining in a note that it
now required project creators to “provide information
about their background and experience, a manufactur-
ing plan (for hardware projects), and a functional
prototype. [Kickstarter] made this change to ensure
that creators have done their research before launching
and backers have sufﬁcient informationwhen deciding
whether to back these projects.”23 The policy was
further reinforced in September 2012, when Kickstarter
reiterated the need for a prototype and made it clear
that product simulations and renderings were not
enough.24
The regression results in Table 9 contrast the relative
changes in a number of key outcome variables for break
weeks versus work weeks before versus after the policy
shock for projects in the design and technology cate-
gories relative to the other 11 categories. First, for the
relative changes in the quantity of projects, we use
a regression inwhich the dependent variable is the ratio
between the number of projects in design and tech-
nology and the number of projects in all other cate-
gories (column 2 of Table 9). The coefﬁcient of the
interaction term between breaks and the period fol-
lowing the policy change is positive and signiﬁcant.
This suggests that when comparing across categories,
breaks are associated with an increase in the relative
number of projects in the categories affected by theTa
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shock. Column 4 of Table 9 shows a similar result for
the relative amount of funding.25 Second, for project
value, column 6 of Table 9 reports results from a re-
gression in which the dependent variable is the ratio
between the share of projects with large target amounts
(over $30,000) in design and technology and the share
of such projects in other categories. Consistent with
Prediction 5, the coefﬁcient of the interaction term shows
that after the policy change, relative to other categories,
the share of large-goal projects signiﬁcantly increased
during break weeks in the affected categories. Finally,
column 8 of Table 9 shows that after the shock, the
relative likelihood of using teams during breaks in-
creases disproportionately for design and technology
projects relative to other categories. Intuitively, this
result is consistent with breaks facilitating team co-
ordination. A more stringent posting requirement
makes teams relatively more desirable because multiple
people can share the workload and tackle the increased
complexity.
6. Conclusion
We explore how slack time inﬂuences the quantity,
quality, and type of innovation. We focus on a novel
mechanism through which slack time can shape in-
ventive outcomes: the opportunity cost of time. Lower
opportunity cost time may induce (1) lower quality
ideas to be developed (a selection effect); (2) more effort
to be applied (an effort effect); and (3) an increase in the
use of teams because scheduling is less constrained
(a coordination effect).
The approach leads to a number of novel results.
First, during breaks, more projects are posted on
Kickstarter in the immediate region next to the colleges.
Second, not all of these projects are marginal ones. In
fact, we observe an increase on both tails of the project
value distribution. Higher value projects seem to be
linked to the ability of entrepreneurs to dedicate more
effort to their ideas when the opportunity cost of time is
low. Overlapping slack time also appears to ease team
coordination, leading to more team-based and more
complex projects.
A key limitation of the paper is that the results are
obtained from an idiosyncratic setting (crowdfunding)
and population (college students). Within that setting,
the estimated effects are large: 45% more projects are
posted during breaks.26 We are also only able to im-
perfectly measure project value and complexity, cannot
identify when a team started working on an idea
(because we only observe projects once they are posted
on the platform), its exact stage of evolution, andwhere
it stands between the ideation and commercialization
stage. This limits the set of alternative explanations that
we can rule out. For example, we are able to show that
the increase in projects is not driven by more funds
becoming available on the platform because students
are on break. We also link breaks at schools with
speciﬁc human capital (e.g., engineers, designers) to
projects in the relevant categories on Kickstarter. Effects
for breaks that are plausibly more exogenous and not
scheduled (snow closings) also provide further ro-
bustness to the causal interpretation of the results. At
the same time, while the model endogenizes effort
allocation, in an ideal setting one would be able to
measure not just the rate of innovation and effort, but
also its direction; that is, are the projects posted when
slack time is available fundamentally more risky and
exploratory? Follow-up research with better data may
be able to answer this question and to directly separate
the role of idea shelving from execution. Deadlinesmay
also play an important role in this context: for example,
are breaks associated with more projects posted be-
cause they are ﬁnite and encourage students to make
progress before work weeks start again? Are continuous
blocks of time important because they allow individuals
to focus without distractions? Given the constraints from
the setting, we are unable to quantify the role of these
alternative explanations.
Table 8. Differences Between Breaks and Work Periods in Project Complexity and the Share of Teams
Variables
(1) Mean
skills
(2) Mean
skills PP
(3) Mean
team size
(4) Share team in
complex (skills)
(5) Share team in
simple (skills)
(6) Share team in
complex
(skills PP)
(7) Share team in
simple
(skills PP)
All breaks 0.0066*** 0.0046*** 0.0024* 0.0009** 0.0004 0.0009** 0.0007
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Observations 3,178,665 3,178,665 3,178,665 3,178,665 3,178,665 3,178,665 3,178,665
R-squared 0.350 0.322 0.458 0.049 0.065 0.107 0.164
Number of
cities
10,091 10,091 10,091 10,091 10,091 10,091 10,091
Notes. For columns 1 and 2, the dependent variables are the mean level of measures of project complexity for all projects in a given city-week.
The two measures we use are the unique number of skills (“skills”) and the unique number of skills per person on the team (“Skills PP”). For
columns 3–7, the dependent variable is the share of team projects among all projects for a given city-week. We deﬁne complex projects as those
that are above the median in terms of the two complexity measures (and simple projects as those below the median). City and week ﬁxed effects
are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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That said, we interpret the empirical results as pro-
viding support for the insights of the theoretical
framework. These insights are general and can inform
policies targeted at encouraging innovation and ex-
perimentation within different types of organizations.
Within an organization, one can broadly think of the
breaks we study in the paper as periods of time where
employees are not required to focus on short-run ob-
jectives, but are allowed to explore new ideas. Slack
time can take multiple forms in such a context: on one
extreme, it could be implemented in a way that is
similar to an academic sabbatical, offering speciﬁc in-
dividuals the possibility to experiment with extremely
risky and novel ideas for an extended period of time.
Examples of this approach are “Skunkworks” projects,
such as IBM’s “Project Chess” (in charge of the IBM
PC), Steve Jobs’ secretive team of “pirates”working off
campus on the ﬁrst Macintosh (Isaacson 2011), and
Google’s X Lab. On the other extreme, slack can be
implemented as a ﬂexible resource that employees can
draw upon on a more regular basis as in 3M’s 15% time
(which was responsible for the Post-It notes) or Goo-
gle’s 20% time (which incubated Gmail and AdSense).
Our results highlight that uninterrupted blocks of time
are critical for developing high-potential ideas. In the
absence of slack, projects that may have already
absorbed time and resources through their ideation
phase may never get developed further because
teams cannot ﬁnd the right time to execute on them.
This challenge has been previously identiﬁed within
the attention-based view of the ﬁrm (Ocasio 1997), and
our paper builds on this view by examining how
a critical, but understudied, component of managerial
attention—time—inﬂuences the types of questions asked
by innovative teams and the projects pursued. Slack
time, by making routine priorities more versus less
salient to managers and innovators, should be con-
sidered as an additional, key dimension of the “orga-
nizational context” that constrains and directs attention
within a ﬁrm.
A key challenge for many organizational approaches
to slack time is that radical new ideas may require
coordination and resources that span the organization.
The more complex the idea, the more likely that “over-
lapping slack” between team members with com-
plementary skills and perspectives will be critical for
its success. In the absence of overlap, teams may not
be able to coordinate and iterate effectively on their
initial concept to ensure momentum within the organi-
zation. Anecdotally, Google, which used to provide 20%
slack time to its employees, recently restructured the
policy as “Area 120.”27 According to Google’s CEO,
Area 120 “is giving people a chance at 20% time more
formally” by offering them longer spells of continu-
ous time (up to multiple months) and the possibility
to build teams across the organization.Ta
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Last, in the absence of incentives targeted at cur-
tailing low-quality contributions and introducing
checkpoints in the use of slack time within an orga-
nization, such policies can also induce a proliferation of
low-value projects. This will likely lead to an ineffective
allocation of resources, as productive individuals are
moved away from their regular tasks to embark on bad
projects. Companies interested in increasing experi-
mentation and innovation through slack time need to
therefore mitigate its negative effects with mecha-
nisms targeted at preventing low-quality contribu-
tions. In the case of LinkedIn’s [in]cubator program,
not only are projects screened by top executives
before entry but the company has also adopted
a milestone-based approach to ensure the quality of
projects at different stages in their evolution.28 This
replicates the model used by professional investors
such as angel investors and venture capitalists to
select startups and progressively increase resources
as a team and idea’s true potential is revealed over time.
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Endnotes
1Crowdfunding is the practice of funding projects online by raising
small amounts of money from a large number of people.
2Mollick (2014) provides an early study of the funding dynamics on
crowdfunding platforms, and Agrawal et al. (2013) discuss key eco-
nomic frictions from the viewpoints of both entrepreneurs and in-
vestors. A key ﬁnding of the literature is that funding increases with
accumulated capital. The crowd views accumulated capital as a signal
of quality, and this may lead to herding (Zhang and Liu 2012,
Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2013, Agrawal et al. 2015). One exception to
this ﬁnding is that of Burtch et al. (2013), who show that public goods
concerns can counteract herding effects. Mollick and Nanda (2016)
examine the “wisdom of the crowd” and show that, overall, the crowd
appears to select projects similar those of experts. Also related to this
information, Burtch et al. (2015) show that privacy concerns play a role
in funding decisions. Instead of informational issues, the paper focuses
on the determinants of the supply of projects and their quality.
3 See details in Online Appendix A2. In an additional extension of the
baseline model, we develop a two-period model in which projects
arriving during the work period can be “shelved” until the break.
This extension does not generate new predictions, but it is useful in
interpreting the empirical results.
4Because it is empirically impossible to identify different arrival rates,
we normalize them to be the same across periods. Allowing for
different arrival rates affects only the ﬁrst prediction because the other
predictions are normalized statements. Intuitively, the arrival rate is
likely to be higher during breaks, because there is more time to think
about ideas. This wouldmake the quantity of ideas developed during
breaks even higher.
5We use an exponential distribution, because it captures two features
of the setting: that support is positive and that distribution is skewed
to the low end (i.e., lower-quality ideas are more likely than higher-
quality ones). Note that Prediction 1–3 do not rely on assumptions
about the distribution.
6The thresholds are determined by π¯w(q)  0⇔ qe¯ − cwe¯22  0⇔ q¯w 
cw e¯2. Thus, q¯0 < q¯1 as c0 < c1.
7The campaign data are obtained from Kickspy, one of the top
websites that monitors live Kickstarter activity over time. This data
source is often used in papers studying crowdfunding, because it is
comprehensive in terms of the variables it captures.
8 See https://pando.com/2012/12/02/memoto-secrets-of-a-half-million
-dollar-kickstarter-campaign/.
9 See http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/
rankings/national-universities/data.
10 In addition, the descriptive statistics show that the maximum
number of successful projects for any U.S. city in a single week is 45
(Los Angeles, California), whereas the maximum number of failed
projects is 79 (also Los Angeles). In a single week, cities are able to
attract as much as $21.8 million in successful funds, with an average
per city-week of $445 and a standard deviation of $23,633.
11Other dependent variables include the total amount raised by the
projects posted in city c during week t, project characteristics for all
projects posted in city c during week t, such as the amount of effort
invested into a project (description length, number of FAQs, and
number of updates), the number of unique skills, and team size.
12Like with many other quasi-experimental regression papers (e.g.,
Athey and Stern 2002, Simcoe and Waguespack 2011), the R-squared
in the analysis in this table is low. This is not surprising given that city
ﬁxed effects are differenced out rather than estimated and that there
are many reasons people post projects on Kickstarter besides having
time during college breaks. Key for our conclusions is that the co-
efﬁcient estimates have statistical power andmagnitudes of economic
importance.
13Online Appendix Table A1 takes this one step further by pro-
gressively dropping schools with the highest enrollment from our
sample (moving from column 1, where all breaks are included, to
column 4, where only breaks in schools with the lowest enrollment
are in the sample). As can be seen from the table, the main effect is
driven by breaks that affect the colleges with the largest enrollment.
The online appendix instead explores the heterogeneity within a
break and across breaks of different lengths. This allows us to see if
most projects are posted right at the beginning of a break and how the
length of a break inﬂuences our main effect.
14The sample projects span the main 13 categories deﬁned by
Kickstarter, including art, comics, dance, design, fashion,ﬁlm andvideo,
food, games, music, photography, publishing, technology, and theater.
15Notice that snow breaks, despite being unexpected, do not provide
a good test for shelving, because they take place in the same context in
which individuals might shelve projects in expectation of future breaks.
16A caveat is that the exact impact of breaks on the quantity and
quality of projects would be different with and without the ability to
shelve projects. However, assigning a direction or magnitude to this
difference is not obvious (see Online Appendix A3 for an extension of
the baseline model that incorporates shelving).
17We ﬁnd the same results when further segmenting the distribution
and allowing for more bins.
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18Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, we also classiﬁed the content of
project updates posted during breaks by break projects and updates
posted not during a break by nonbreak projects. Break updates were
more likely to discuss fundraising or thank the crowd for its sup-
port, to involve brainstorming or the discussion of ideas for the
project, to cover a discussion of materials, inputs, manufacturing, and
production (including ﬁlming and recording), and to update backers
on shipping and estimated delivery time. Nonbreak updates were
more likely to acknowledge a delay or discuss something else (al-
though this second difference is small).We did not ﬁnd any difference
in how frequently the different sets of project updates discussed
issues with the projects (other than delays).
19Given the same mean of the value distribution, the certainty-
equivalent value (i.e., the payoff an agent would have to receive to
be indifferent between a certain outcome and an uncertain one) of
a risky project decreases with its variance. Thus, with lower devel-
opment costs, a risk-averse entrepreneur would be willing to accept
riskier projects that have lower certainty-equivalent values.
20Despite the possibility that students spend their breaks visiting
family or on vacation, the assumption that coordination costs are
lower during breaks is reasonable, because in contrast to regular
school weeks—in which all students are uniformly busy with
schoolwork—the students interested in entrepreneurial projects are
able to control their schedule more freely during breaks.
21This is based on whether a project is above or below the median in
terms of complexity.
22Whereas ourmeasures for complexity are not perfect, for them to be
problematic for the interpretation of the results, entrepreneurs
working on projects during breaks would need to systematically
include more skills in their bios—relatively to the ones they
have—than entrepreneurs working during work weeks. If the
measures are instead noisy, this would bias us against ﬁnding the
hypothesized effects.
23 See https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/accountability-on-kickstarter.
24 See https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-not-a-store.
25Columns 1 and 3 provide a baseline comparison between break and
work periods for the relative number of projects (or the relative
amount of total funds) in design and technology categories relative to
all the other categories.
26This large effect is plausible given the large number of students
relative to the number of Kickstarter projects. In particular, a back-of-
the-envelope calculation suggests that this increase amounts to 458
new projects per year, a small number relative to the over 4 million
students enrolled in the top 200 colleges in the United States.
27http://www.forbes.com/sites/miguelhelft/2016/05/19/google-ceo
-sundar-pichai-conﬁrms-area-120-corporate-incubator/\#409a3dc44f73.
28According to the company, ideas ﬁrst must be developed as pro-
totypes and clear two rounds of judging, where the ﬁnal round is
directly run by Founder Reid Hoffman and CEO Jeff Weiner. Given
the stakes and visibility of these judging rounds, it is clear that
employees have strong incentives to perform. Only projects showing
promise at 30 days graduate to 60-day projects, and only those that
have made sufﬁcient additional progress at day 60 are allowed
another 30-day extension. See https://blog.linkedin.com/2012/12/
07/linkedin-incubator.
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